The effects of debt versus equity inflows on savings and growth in developing economies by Lächler, Ulrich & Nunnenkamp, Peter
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Lächler, Ulrich; Nunnenkamp, Peter
Working Paper
The effects of debt versus equity
inflows on savings and growth in
developing economies
Kiel Working Papers, No. 276
Provided in cooperation with:
Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW)
Suggested citation: Lächler, Ulrich; Nunnenkamp, Peter (1987) : The effects of debt versus
equity inflows on savings and growth in developing economies, Kiel Working Papers, No. 276,
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/52672Kieler Arbeitspapiere
Kiel Working Papers
Working Paper No. 276
The Effects of Debt Versus Equity In-
flows on Savings and Growth in
Developing Economies*
by
Ulrich /Lachler and Peter Nunnenkamp
Institut fur Vteltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel
ISSN 0342-0787Kieler Arbeitspapiere
Kiel Working Papers
Working Paper No. 276
The Effects of Debt Versus Equity In-
flows on Savings and Growth in
Developing Economies*
by
Ulrich jLachler and Peter Nunnenkamp
Institut fur Wfeltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel
ISSN 0342-0787I. Introduction
Since the onset of the international debt crisis, various
new schemes and innovative financial arrangements have been pro-
posed with the purpose of alleviating the external debt problems
currently experienced by many developing countries; see World
Development Report (1985). A common element in many of these
proposals is the intent to alter the external capital structure
of developing countries toward claims based on some form of risk
and profit sharing (i.e., equity participation), away from claims
involving debt. This applies, for example, to recent measures
designed to promote foreign direct investments (as the Multila-
teral Investment Guarantee Agency), debt-equity swap arrangements
(introduced in Chile) , the promotion of mutual funds containing
stocks of developing country industries (such as the Korean
Fund), and contingency arrangements, such as commodity-linked
bonds, with clauses that index their returns to the price of key
commodities exported by the borrower (recent debt renegotiations
involving Mexico and Venezuela included such clauses).
A shift in the external capital structure, as projected by
these measures, would yield the obvious benefit of reducing the
extremely heavy debt burden of some developing countries. From a
broader welfare perspective, however, can it be claimed that a
developing country would be better off with a lower external
debt-equity ratio? This question has recently been addressed in
terms of a choice-theoretic model based on an agent-principal
approach (Lachler, 1985) . That analysis arrived at the familiar
result that both a first-best "cooperative" or a second-best- 2 -
"non-cooperative" equilibrium are possible outcomes of the capi-
tal transfer negotiations between foreign principals and the
managing authorities of a developing country; the outcome at-
tained depends on what information is available to the princi-
pals. It was then shown that if conditions conducive to a co-
operative equilibrium pertain, a shift from debt financed to
equity financed transfers, leaving the total capital inflow the
same, would yield an unambiguous welfare improvement from the
viewpoint of the capital importing nation. With a non-cooperative
environment, however, the answer to the question posed above is
less clear cut. In that case, the choice between equity or debt
financed inflows can be shown to involve a "risk-return" tradeoff
between income stability and expected growth. That is, with a
higher proportion of equity financed inflows, the variability of
residual income generated and retained in the developing economy
would decline, but the domestic savings incentives and hence the
future growth prospects of that economy would also be reduced.
In view of these conclusions, it is of considerable interest
for the purpose of formulating policy recommendations to deter-
mine whether the actual environment in which capital transfers to
developing countries take place is more accurately characterized
by a cooperative or non-cooperative process. This essay seeks to
provide some evidence on this issue, using data from a sample of
36 developing countries over the period 1976-1979. Cross-country
regression analyses are applied to test several competing hypo-
theses concerning the domestic savings and growth response of
developing nations to alternative sources of capital inflows.
These hypotheses are explicitly derived from the agent-principal
model mentioned previously, and to be discussed next.- 3 -
II. A Discussion of the Basic Model
The theoretical framework on which the preceding statements
are based originates from the modern literature on the firm that
focuses on the agency relationships, or moral hazard problems,
arising from the separation of ownership and control when moni-
toring costs are non-negligible (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976;
Ross, 1977; Stiglitz, 1974). In contrast to the traditional pro-
fit-maximizing postulate, this literature builds on the assump-
tion that the incentive structure governing the behavior of
decision-makers in a firm varies with the rules that determine
how the proceeds from that firm are distributed. Since those
rules are intimately connected to the firm's financial structure,
a change in the debt-equity ratio -, for example, is likely to
affect the firm's performance. With this approach, the
Modigliani-Miller Theorem holds only as a special case, when
various market imperfections are removed.
Several authors have adopted a similar approach to explain
different aspects of the international credit market, with an em-
phasis on the debt related problems of developing countries
(Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981; Folkerts-Landau, 1985; Sachs, 1982).
In this context, the decision-making authorities of a capital-
recipient country can be visualized as agents in an economic
enterprise vis-a-vis foreign principals. Lachler (1985) has ex-
tended this work by developing a choice-theoretic model that
simultaneously incorporates both equity and debt instruments as
alternative sources of foreign capital. The basic assumptions
made in that model are:- 4 -
(i) Aggregate future output of a small developing economy is a
function of current investment and an exogenous random element,
whose value is realized after the investment decision has taken
place.
(ii) The aggregate investment decision is made by a social plan-
ner, characterized as a risk-averse agent maximizing a well-
behaved social expected utility function with domestic con-
sumption as its argument.
(iii) Foreign capital owners supplying external funds are mo-
delled as rational risk-neutral principals, who are indifferent
to whether a capital transfer takes place in the form of debt or
equity participation as long as the expected return on both
claims is the same. From their viewpoint, the claims on this
economy represent only one of many investment opportunities in a
diversified asset portfolio.
(iv) Foreign capital inflows are perfectly "fungible", whether
they appear in the form of debt, equity or foreign aid (treated
here as an unrequited gift) . In other words, once a transfer of
capital has taken place, the agent obtains total control in dis-
posing of these funds for current investment or consumption pur-
poses .
In this stylized setting, a moral hazard situation arises
once a transfer of capital has occurred. This situation is due to
an informational asymmetry: The principal, unlike the agent, does- 5 -
not know how much is effectively invested after the capital
transfer takes place. All he observes is the level of output
generated in the future, which is only partly a function of in-
vestment and in part stochastic. That rules out the possibility
of setting up contingency contracts, that link the terms of
transfer to the e_x post level of investment undertaken (see, e.g.
Haque and Mirakhor, 1986). Consequently, the following disin-
centive problems emerge: If the transfer takes place in the form
of equity participation, entitling the principal to a pre-nego-
tiated share of future output, the agent has an ejc post incentive
to invest a smaller portion of the currently available funds (and
hence consume more) than if the same transfer had been made as a
gift. Alternatively, if the transfer is made in exchange for debt
claims entitling the principal to a fixed sum in the future, then
in making his investment decision, the agent has an ex post in-
centive to accept more risk than in the case of a gift-transfer,
which translates into a greater intertemporal variability of
domestic consumption. Both types of behavior on the part of the
agent would, ceteris paribus, reduce the expected value of claims
held by the principal. Rational principals, however, would anti-
cipate such behavior before effecting the transfer, and demand
commensurate adjustments in the terms and conditions at which the
transfer is made.
A cooperative outcome of this transfer process is conceiv-
able if the agent "cooperates" with the principals and complies
with all previously negotiated commitments, including the amount
of investment to be undertaken, in spite of the disincentives
noted above. Perhaps more realistically, this outcome could be- 6 -
achieved if the principal has the ability to monitor the agent
directly or to impose penalties on the agent for not responding
in this cooperative manner. That would eliminate the moral hazard
problem. However, if the costs of monitoring are sufficiently
high, due to information barriers or limited legal enforcement
capabilities, only a non-cooperative outcome may be feasible,
which generally leaves the agent in a less favorable position
relative to the hypothetical cooperative outcome.
Since it is difficult to say, a priori, whether the transfer
negotiations are more likely to converge to a cooperative or
non-cooperative equilibrium, both solutions were investigated,
yielding the basic conclusions reported in the introduction.
These were, to repeat, that in a cooperative environment the
risk-averse agent would always prefer equity over debt financed
inflows, while in a non-cooperative environment he would choose
some optimal combination of both types of claims, corresponding
to a preferred point on an implicit tradeoff between domestic
income variability and expected future consumption. Alone on the
basis of this conclusion, one might infer that a non-cooperative
equilibrium is more representative of actual transfer processes,
since most countries usually receive foreign loans as well as
direct investments. This outcome, however, could as easily be due
to the fact that those countries have faced supply-constraints in
terms of the types of transfers made available by foreign princi-
pals.
A stronger and more interesting set of competing hypotheses
emerges when both equilibria are subjected to a comparative
statics analysis. This was done in Lachler (1985, section 5) to- 7 -
derive the equilibrium investment response to a foreign capital
inflow from alternative sources. The results reveal an important
difference: In a non-cooperative environment, the equilibrium
change in aggregate investment, I, resulting from an increase in
foreign transfers, T, obeys the following pattern:
1) dl/dT | < dl/dT | < dl/dT |
Equity Aid Debt
and 0 < dl/dT| s 1. Aid, once again, is simply considered as a
Aid
gift that raises the initial endowment of the capital recipient.
It turns out, here, that dl/dT| may be negative, while
Equity
dl/dT| is always positive.
Debt
On the other hand, in a cooperative environment the follow-
ing pattern results:
2) dl/dT| s (dl/dT| , dl/dT| ),
Aid Equity Debt
such that, also 0 < dl/dT| s 1. Expression (2) states that in
Aid
a cooperative situation the agent would always invest more in
response to transfers entailing future repayment obligations, be
they in the form of equity or debt, than in response to a gift.
Whether in this case, dl/dT | ? dl/dT | , is considered
Equity Debt
indeterminate, since that depends among other things, on the
2
initial level of outstanding obligations .
A corollary of this result is that domestic savings and out-
put growth should exhibit the same order of response behavior in
respective environments. That is because domestic savings, S, are- 8 -
defined as total minus foreign savings, I-T, so that dS/dT =
dl/dT-l. The only necessary modification to be made in expres-
sions (1) and (2) is that the expected response to an aid inflow
would then be bounded by, -1 £ dS/dT| S 0. Similarly, on the
Aid
assumption that a nation's growth rate is positively related to
the amount of investment, the same pattern of growth responses to
foreign inflows as described by the preceding expressions should
result. Our purpose next is to devise some tests that may help us
to discriminate which of the two patterns given by expressions
(1) and (2) best characterizes actual transfer processes.
III. Equation Specification and Statement of Hypotheses
The basic equation to be estimated below using cross-country
data is of the form:
(3) Xi = aQ + a1(FDI/GDP)i + a?(AID/GDP)i + a3(DEBT/GDP)i
The exogenous variables on the right hand side of this expression
represent the net foreign capital inflows per annum received by
country i in the form of foreign direct investment, aid, and
through debt-related channels, each expressed as a share of GDP.
The proxies used for these variables are discussed later. Suffice
it to note here that FDI represents our measure of foreign capi-
tal introduced in form of equity participation.
Three variables are used separately for the endogenous vari-
able, X.. These are (i) the domestic savings rate, DSP, also- 9 -
expressed in shares of GDP, (ii) the aggregate investment rate,
IR, and (iii) the annual per capita growth rate of GDP, denoted
GR
3.
Our maintained hypothesis is that capital transfers to de-
veloping countries are best described by a non-cooperative pro-
cess. From expression (1), we would therefore expect to obtain
coefficient estimates in eq. (3) that obey the following pattern:
(4)
Furthermore, with regard to the individual coefficient estimates,
the theory states that these should satisfy the following con-
straints :
(5) a) -1 S a? S 0, when the endogenous variable is DSR.
b) 0 S a2 S 1, " " " " " IR.
c) a > 0,
d) a3 ^ 0, " " " " " IR or GR.
Our first step, then, is to see whether any of these constraints
can be statistically rejected.
Our primary concern, however, is less with the absolute size
of the individual coefficients. For purposes of theory valida-
tion, it is their relative size that mainly interests us. With
that focus in mind, we can set up the general counterhypothesis,
proposing that there is no significant difference in the respon-
ses to alternative forms of capital inflows. This counterhypothe-
sis may be supported or rejected by testing the simultaneous con-- 10 -
straint,
(6)
Continuing along these lines, we can proceed to make pair-wise
comparisons, and examine whether the data permits us to reject
the following restrictions:
(7) a) a2 = a3
b) a1 = a3
c) ax = a2
It is important to note here that the crucial test for supporting
or rejecting the assumption of a non-cooperative environment
against the counterhypothesis, that a cooperative environment
applies, concerns restriction (7.c). By comparing expressions (1)
and (2), we observe that in both cases it would be predicted that
a, a a?, and further, that it is left indeterminate, whether a, ?
a., in a cooperative environment. What is clear, however, is that
in a cooperative environment we would observe that a. 5 a_, while
in the non-cooperative environment, a.. 5 a«.
Having performed these tests, two further issues are ad-
dressed below. Since the coefficient estimates are made by ordi-
nary least square methods, it is necessary to discuss the simul-
taneity biases that might be involved in this procedure. The
other issue concerns the sample homogeneity. Is it possible that
in some developing countries a cooperative relationship with
foreign principals has developed, but not in others? This- 11 -
question is examined by performing separate analyses for "pro-
blem" countries that encountered debt-servicing difficulties
during, or shortly after, the relevant sample period, and for the
remaining countries.
The impact of foreign inflows on domestic savings and growth
has been a subject of controversy for many years in the develop-
ment literature. This has led to a substantial body of empirical
research (as surveyed, e.g., in Bhagwati, 1978), some of which
bears a resemblance to the regressions reported on here. Much of
this work, however, is mainly concerned with the effectiveness of
foreign aid. One major bone of contention is whether aid raises
total domestic investment by an equal amount, as assumed in early
applied development models (Chenery and Strout, 1966; Leontief,
1965); or is fungible enough to be treated as a general increment
to income (Mosley, 1980; Papanek, 1972; Weisskopf, 1974); or is
downright deleterious, for various socio-political reasons, as
argued in Griffin and Enos (1970). While various attempts were
also made to differentiate between alternative sources of foreign
inflows, such as private versus other official inflows (e.g.,
Papanek, 1973; Dowling and Hiemenz, 1983), none have addressed
the central equity-versus-debt distinction emphasized in this
essay. Another contrast with most earlier reasearch emerges from
the fact that the estimated coefficient values in equation (3) by
themselves reveal little about whether a developing country is
better off receiving one form of inflow or another. To arrive at
such welfare conclusions it is necessary to place the regression
estimates in a specific choice-theoretic context, such as we have
described earlier. Previous related empirical studies have gene-
rally not provided such an explicit context.- 12 -
IV. The Empirical Results
A. The Data Base - Some Explanatory Remarks
To perform our cross-country analysis, we began with an
initial sample of about 50 developing economies, for which the
required data was available. This sample was then reduced to 36
countries by eliminating those that reported net financial out-
flows of direct investment, debt or development aid for the en-
tire period, 1976-79. Since our studv concerns the impact of
foreign financial _in_flows on economic performance, this sample
restriction seems appropriate; see Weisskopf (1974), who employs
a similar procedure. The data base for the remaining 36 countries
is presented in Table Al of Appendix A, along with an explanation
of the sources and definitions of the individual variables. This
sample, though considerably reduced, still covers a wide spectrum
of developing economies in terms of income levels, economic per-
formance, overall dependence on foreign resource inflows, and the
structure of capital imports.
Before presenting the regression results, it is necessary to
explain why the analysis is restricted to the period 1976-79. To
begin, comparable time series on the structure of net capital
imports were not available until 1976. On the other hand, sta-
tistical information on most of our variables was available up to
1984, except for domestic savings. Nevertheless, we decided to
concentrate on the second half of the 1970s because, later on,
both the volume and structure of international capital transfers
to developing countries was significantly affected by severe
economic shocks. At the turn of the decade, the second oil priceBibliothek
6ei Institutes fiir Weltwirtschaft
- 13 -
shock induced a new round of enormous financial recycling of OPEC
surpluses, which drastically altered the previous pattern of
financial flows of the late 1970s. This was followed in the early
19 80s by another shock to the international capital markets: With
the eruption of severe repayment crises in some important debtor
countries, Western commercial banks abruptly halted the provision
of fresh money to the problem-ridden Latin American region. That
also altered the flows to developing countries, both in terms of
regional distribution and structural composition. To avoid sta-
tistical noise on this account, we chose 1979 as our endpoint
date. Finally, we added all flows within each category over the
period 1976-79, so that the sample points reported in Table Al
represent period aggregates or averages.
Table 1 reports the correlation coefficients between all
variables used in the subsequent regression analyses. In view of
the fairly small correlation between the independent variables,
we should not expect any serious multicollinearity problems to
arise.
B. Estimation Results
The coefficient estimates obtained from the regressions
described by equation (3) are presented in Table 2. The most
remarkable feature of these results is that in all cases the
estimated coefficient values clearly follow the characteristic
pattern of a non-cooperative equilibrium. That is, a.. < a_ < a_.
























































































Terms in brackets are standard errors. See text for definitions. Equations (1) and (3) were estimated with a sample of 36
countries, equation (2) with a sample of 35 (data on IR was not available for Nepal).
All estimations were made by OLS.- 14 -
tained hypothesis, and outlined earlier in expressions (5.a)-
(5.d), can be rejected with much confidence. Although the point
estimates of a_ in regressions (2) and (3) of Table 2 violate
conditions (5.b) and (5.c), this deviation from the predicted
4
range is not significant at the 5% level . We can conclude from
these results that the basic behavioral responses suggested by
our model, along with the hypothesis that capital transfers take
place in a non-cooperative environment, are not rejected by the
empirical evidence.
The next logical step, in view of this outcome, is to exa-
mine whether any alternative hypotheses can be rejected. This is
done by testing the parameter restrictions described in expres-
sions (6) and (7.a)-(7.c). Toward that purpose, we use a standard
F-test procedure of estimating the restricted form of regression
equation (3) and comparing the resulting sum of squared residuals
with those obtained from the unrestricted estimations, presented
in Table 2. Table. 3 reports these test results. From the first
column of F-statistics we observe that the counterhypothesis,
which claims that all forms of external finance are alike in
their impact on economic performance, is unanimously rejected. In
other words, there does appear to be a significant difference in
the savings and growth response to alternative sources of fi-
nance. With regard to the other (pair-wise) constraint tests, the
results are not quite as powerful. We may note, however, that
each of the restrictions, (7.a)-(7.c), is rejected at least once
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SSR denotes the sum of squared residuals obtained by estimating equation (3)
with the respective constraints imposed. These values are then compared with
the SSR of the unconstrained estimations, reported in Table 2, to derive the
F-statistic values here. A * indicates that the restriction can be rejected at
the 5% significance level.- 15 -
As argued earlier, the test of restriction (7.c) is the
decisive one in terms of pitting the non-cooperative hypothesis
against the cooperative counterhypothesis. Given that the pre-
vious estimations yielded cL < a«, a rejections of the con-
straint, a, = a2, is sufficient for rejecting the cooperative
hypothesis, which states that a., £ a2. From the last column of
Table 3 we observe that while restriction (7.c) cannot be re-
jected when DSR and IR are used as dependent variables in the
regression equations, it is rejected when GR is employed.
C. Simultaneous Equations Problems
The overall results obtained so far give fairly strong sup-
port to our maintained hypothesis. But since the estimation tech-
nique we used involves single-equation ordinary least squares,
some doubts are bound to arise with regard to the unbiasedness of
the estimated coefficients. Such doubts have been frequently
voiced in criticism of similar studies addressing the effective-
ness of foreign aid (e.g., Over, 1975; Papanek, 1972). The main
thrust of these critiques is that domestic savings and growth not
only are determined by the amount of foreign aid inflows, but in
turn they also determine how much aid flows in. Consequently, AID
would not be fully exogenous in equation (3), which violates the
orthogonality principle and leads to biased estimates.
With respect to the two-way causation argument between AID
and domestic savings or growth, an underlying premise is that
foreign assistance is largely given (for altruistic reasons) to
countries in need. That by itself, however, is not enough to- 16 -
generate biased estimates. A further necessary assumption for
that result is that "needy" countries are more likely to exhibit
lower savings (or growth) rates. Should that assumption be valid,
then the estimated relation between aid and savings or growth
will reflect both the response of aid recipients and the motives
of aid donors.
To account for the possibility of two-way causation in the
case of AID, we reestimated equations (3) using a two stage,
instrumental variable technique, such that DEBT/GDP, FDI/GDP and
GDP/capita were specified as the exogenous instruments. In spite
of this adjustment, all three regressions yielded the same basic
results as were obtained by OLS. The 2SLS regression involving GR
provides a representative example:
(8) GR = 3.79 - 2.81 (FDI/GDP) - 0.11 (AID/GDP) +0.02 (DEBT/GDP)
(1.52) (0.96) (0.35) (0.23)
SSR = 190 (standard errors in parentheses)
By comparing this result with the third regression in Table 2, we
note that the relative order of the estimated coefficients is the
same in both cases. That is, cL < a_ < a,, as hypothesized for a
non-cooperative environment.
The two-way causality argument applied to AID is much less
plausible in the case of FDI and DEBT inflows. Consequently, we
did not attempt to explore this possibility further. If the nega-
tive coefficients obtained for (FDI/GDP) in our previous regres-
sions are to be blamed on simultaneity bias, the logical corol-
lary would have to be that FDI (but not DEBT) is systematically- 17 -
channeled to low-saving or slow-growing economies. It is diffi-
cult to find a persuasive argument to justify this type of be-
havior among foreign capital owners.
D. Sample Homogeneity
When some firms, or countries, go bankrupt or encounter
debt-servicing problems, and others do not, it is difficult to
say, offhand, whether this outcome is simply due to random draws
of fate or also to alternative patterns of conduct among the
relevant decision-makers, which influenced their luck different-
ly. One reason for supposing the latter is that some agents may
have developed a cooperative relationship with their outside
principals, while others remained in a non-cooperative relation-
ship. One result to emerge from the earlier theoretical conside-
rations is that the level of investment undertaken in response to
a debt-financed transfer is always less in a non-cooperative
equilibrium than in a cooperative one. At the same time, the
terms of a transfer (e.g., interest rate) are always less favor-
able for the capital recipient in a non-cooperative environment
relative to a cooperative environment. I.e., the agent bears the
agency costs of finance. Consequently, the likelihood that a
borrower would run into debt-servicing difficulties is always
higher in a non-cooperative environment.
To investigate this issue, we separated our cross-country
data into two subsamples on the basis of whether or not a country
was engaged in multilateral debt renegotiations during the period
1975-1984, as stated in the World Development Report (1985, fig.- 18 -
2.4A). Under the assumption that some countries developed a co-
operative relationship, in contrast to others, we would expect
these to be more highly concentrated among the sample of coun-
tries that have not experienced debt-servicing problems. Separate
regressions of equation (3) were then performed over each sub-
sample, to see if any difference in the pattern of responses
emerged. When DSR and IR were used as dependent variables, the
separate estimation results (not shown here) were both fairly
close to those obtained from the combined sample regressions,
shown in Table 2. This was also reflected in the F-tests, that
compare the SSR's from both subsample regressions to the re-
spective (constrained) SSR's in Table 2. In the case of DSR,
F4 ?8
 = 1'^5 r and in the case of IR, F. __ = 0.95. Both are in-
significant.
In the case of GR as the dependent variable, however, we
obtain an F-statistic value of F. 0Q = 3.22, which is significant
at the 5% level. The subsample regressions that yield this result
are:
Countries that renegotiated (n = 17)
(9) GR = 3.98 - 2.30 (FDI/GDP) - 0.68 (AID/GDP) +0.06 (DEBT/GDP)
(0.98) (0.84) (0.25) (0.37)
R
2 = 0.58 R
2 = 0.48 SSR = 53 F, n, = 6.0- 19 -
Countries that did not renegotiate (n = 19)
(10) GR = 4.08 + 3.46(FDI/GDP) - 0.18(AID/GDP) + 0.03(DEBT/GDP)
(1.20) (4.51) (0.14) (0.25)
R
2 = 0.18 R
2 = 0.01 SSR = 74 F_. , = 1.07
(standard errors in parentheses)
From equation (9), we observe that the countries encounter-
ing debt-servicing difficulties exhibit the typical response
pattern characteristic of a non-cooperative environment. Further-
more, the overall R
2 of the regression is quite high. A notice-
able contrast emerges in the case of countries that did not re-
negotiate. In equation (10), the estimated coefficient values
obey a pattern that is more consistent with a cooperative en-
vironment, giving some support to the notion that a different
transfer relationship, involving different response patterns, may
have developed in some countries. With that interpretation, the
low R
2 of regression (10) is to be expected, since the data
sample in question contains a more heterogenous group of coun-
tries, in terms of cooperative and non-cooperative behavior, than
the sample used for regression (9).- 20 -
V. Conclusions
We propose that our preceding estimation results be interpreted
within a specific choice-theoretic context. That context was
provided by an agent-principal model of capital transfers, where
both a cooperative and a non-cooperative equilibrium are pos-
sible. A central prediction of that model is that the aggregate
savings and investment responses to alternative forms of capital
inflows are systematically different, depending on whether a
cooperative or non-cooperative setting applies. The purpose of
this analysis has been to determine which of the two response
patterns best describes the observed behavior among developing
countries. Our empirical estimations and hypothesis test results
suggest that, with some possible exceptions, most developing
countries were engaged in a non-cooperative relationship with
foreign suppliers of capital during the period analyzed.
The consequence of a non-cooperative equilibrium is that
capital recipients face a tradeoff between less income variation
and faster growth, when confronted by the alternative of receiv-
ing equity or debt financed inflows. Whereas debt financed trans-
fers exert a relatively stronger positive influence on domestic
savings and growth, equity financed transfers provide the benefit
of lower fluctuations in domestic consumption. This means that
neither form of capital inflow can be judged unambiguously su-
perior to the other, and thus recommended for all countries,
independent of social attitudes towards risk.- 21 -
An unambiguous welfare improvement can only result from a
shift of this tradeoff toward less risk and more growth. How to
bring such shifts about is beyond the scope of this essay. Broad-
ly speaking, this would require some fundamental institutional
changes (e.g., improved communication channels, a better defined
and uniform allocation of legal rights, and effective legal en-
forcement) , especially within many developing countries, to re-
duce monitoring costs and thereby provide a more conducive set-
ting for attaining cooperative equilibria. Our previous sample
homogeneity test gives a partial indication that some countries
may have evolved further in this regard than others. Those coun-
tries, once identified, can provide suitable examples for further
study and possible emulation.- 22 -
Appendix A: Definition of Variables
The data for the explanatory variables, aid, debt, and di-
rect investment, is taken from OECD, Geographical Distribution of
Financial Flows to Developing Countries.
Aid consists of grants and net official development assis-
tance (ODA) loans provided by the member countries of the
OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), multilateral
agencies, and OPEC member countries. The figures do not
include financial flows from the IMF (except loans by the
IMF Trust Fund), member countries of the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance, other developing countries, and grants
by private voluntary agencies. Grants cover gifts, in money
or in kind, for which no repayment is required as well as
grant-like flows, i.e. loans repayable in the recipients'
currencies. ODA loans carry maturities of over one year and
contain a grant element (as a measure of the concessionality
of a loan) of at least 25 per cent. Official loans with a
grant element of less than 25 per cent appear under the
heading "other official flows (OOF)" and are classified in
our study as debt creating financial flows.
In addition to net OOF, our debt figures include net private
sector flows in the form of export credits and portfolio
investment (as defined in the OECD source) from DAC members.
Portfolio investment largely corresponds to transactions by
the private monetary sector (bank sector loans). Loans by
branches in offshore centres of banks resident in DAC coun-
tries are omitted. The portfolio investment figure is a- 23 -
direct measurement of new bank transactions with more than
one year maturities, less repayments of principal, converted
to US-$ at the average annual exchange rate.
The data on direct investment is from the OECD figures on
net private sector flows from DAC member countries to devel-
oping countries.
Table Al presents aid, debt, and direct investment both in
absolute amounts for 1976-79 and as a percentage share of the
recipient country's GDP over this period. To calculate the latter
figures, the developing countries' nominal GDP (published in IMF,
International Financial Statistics) is converted to US-$ by ap-
plying annual average exchange rates. Data on the economic per-
formance variables (apart from domestic savings which are not
reported there) are also from International Financial Statistics.
Average annual economic growth rates in 1976-79 refer to GDP per
capita in constant prices while investment ratios refer to the
average share of gross fixed capital formation in GDP. Infor-
mation on gross national savings (excluding net current transfers
from abroad) is from World Bank, World Tables, and is expressed
as a share of GDP, as reported in the same source. It should be
remembered that, within the system of national account statis-
tics, gross national savings are calculated as a residual, i.e.
gross domestic capital formation minus the current account defi-
cit. However, since our figures for DSR and IR appear from dif-
ferent sources, they may not be exactly related in this indicated
manner.Table A1






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Columns (2) - (4) : unweighted averages for the years 1976-79; columns (5) - (7) : aggregated net financial inflows in the
period 1976-79; columns (8) - (11): aggregated financial inflows in per cent of aggregated nominal gross domestic product in
1976-79; for a detailed definition of variables and calculation procedures, see the text. - TJominal GDP in domestic currency
converted to tJS-$ by applying the period average exchange rate. -*Indicates countries that entered into debt renegotiation be-
tween 1976-1984.
Sources: World Bank, World Development Report 1983; World Bank, World Tables, Third Edition; IMF, International Financial Sta-
tistics, var. iss.; OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, var. iss.- 24 -
Appendix B: A Mathematical Outline of the Underlying Theoretical
Model (from Laqhler, 1985)
A two-period Fisherian consumption model is considered, where
future output is a stochastic function of current investment.
(B.I) Qt+1 = xt+1 F(It)
Q = aggregate output, I = investment, x = a stochastic variable
with mean 1, distributed according to the probability density
function, g(x), over the non-negative interval (0,x).
The expected social utility function to be maximized by the
agent is:
x
(B.2) S = U(C.) + B / U(C. -)g(x)dx,
r 0 t+i
where U' > 0, U'' £ 0 and U(0) = 0. We also have that,
Ct = y + T - It, Ct+1 = Max (y [xt+1 F(It)-B], 0)
y = initial endowment of the agent
3 = discount term
T = capital transfer from abroad
B = the amount owed to the foreign principal in period 2, in re-
turn for a debt transfer in period 1.
y = domestic equity share = 1 minus the equity share of net out-
put accruing to the foreign principal in return for an equity
transfer in period 1.- 25 -
The present expected value of a combined claim (held by the
foreign principal), involving an amount, B, of debt and (1-y) in
foreign equity participation, can be expressed, for any given
level of investment by the agent, as
x
(B.3) T = F(I)[1 - Y / (x-b)g(x)dx],
b
where b = B/F(I) . In this simplified version of the model, the
absence of "sovereign risk" is assumed.
For a given transfer of size T, the cooperative equilibrium
solution is derived by maximizing S w.r.t. (I,Y) or (I,B) subject
to equation (B.3). The non-cooperative equilibrium solution is
derived by maximizing S only w.r.t. I, given Y and B. The result-
ing first-order condition, together with equation (B.3) are then
used to solve for the equilibrium values of (I,Y) or (I,B).
A transfer in the form of foreign aid (gifts) can be simply
treated as an increase in y.- 26 -
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Footnotes
1. The basic equations of the model that correspond to these
assumptions are provided in Appendix B.
2. It also turns out that, for any given level of foreign debt
or equity financed transfers, the equilibrium level of in-
vestment undertaken by the agent is always greater in a
cooperative environment than in a non-cooperative one.
3. Additional regressions were also performed with the annual
growth rate of GDP (unadjusted for population growth) in-
stead of GR as the dependent variable. Since no significant
difference in the estimation and hypothesis-test results
emerged, we do not report those additional results.
4. Notice that the regressions with DSR and IR in Table 2 ex-
hibit a higher R
2 than the one with GR as dependent vari-
able. That observation can also be given an interpretation
that is consistent with our theoretical model: Recall that
the basic theory concerns the determination of investment,
while changes in output are necessarily a stochastic func-
tion of investment. Hence, even if our empirical model could
perfectly explain all variations of IR (i.e., with an R
2 of
1) , we should still expect a less than perfect fit in the
case of GR.
On the other hand, there could be measurement errors that
may offset the statement just made. That is, the observed- 30 -
values of IR and DSR may not correspond to true investment,
in the sense of foregone present consumption to raise future
expected output. The empirical distinction between invest-
ment and consumption is largely a matter of convention.
Thus, the label of investment is attached to various con-
sumption activities (perquisites) by management and to white
elephant projects mainly designed to enhance the glory of
some transient politicians, while other more productive
expenditures (on cars, for example) are mislabeled con-
sumption. This problem should not arise in the case of
growth figures, since output changes presumably reflect true
investment activities, independent of how they are labeled.